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Abstract
We study optimal smart contract design for monitoring an exchange of an item
performed oﬄine. There are two parties, a seller and a buyer. Exchange happens
off-chain, but the status update takes place on-chain. The exchange can be verified
but with a cost. To guarantee self-enforcement of the smart contract, both parties
make a deposit and the deposits must cover payments made in all possible final
states. Both parties have an (opportunity) cost of making deposits. We discuss two
classes of contract: In the first, the contract only interacts with the seller, while in
the second, the contract can also interact with the buyer. In both cases, we derive
optimal contracts specifying optimal deposits and verification policies.
Keywords— Smart Contracts, Deposit Design, Costly State Verification
1 Introduction
Smart contracts offer a new way of implementing economic mechanisms.1 A smart
contract uses trust in distributed consensus as a substitute for a trustworthy media-
tor that is usually assumed in classical mechanism design. In a classical mechanism,
a trustworthy mediator enforces the rules of the mechanism and calculates, based
on the information provided by the participants, an allocation of resources. The
mediator can be an auctioneer, an intermediary in a platform market, a court that
enforces rules. In contrast to this, a mechanism encoded in a smart contract is
hard-wired to perform the rules of the mechanism. The rules of the mechanism are
self-enforcing. In particular, commitment can be encoded in the protocol. In the
∗We thank Robert M. Townsend and Dan Cao for their valuable feedback.
1Smart contracts are programs written in a Turing complete language and executed in a blockchain
environment. Buterin (2016) describes the first implementation of smart contracts in the Ethereum
environment. Recent development allows smart contracts to be fed a trustworthy data from public
databases, to make them more efficient for the usage, see Zhang et al. (2016).
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case of an item exchange, a popular application of smart contracts, commitment is
achieved by paying deposits in the contract.2
Smart contracts give rise to interesting design questions that have not usually
been considered in the mechanism design literature. In classical mechanism design,
information is elicited and allocation and transfers are implemented and enforced
by the mechanism designer. Any necessary transfers are made immediately at zero
transaction cost and are intermediated by the mechanism designer. In a smart
contract, deposits are made before the contract is executed and all transfers made
between the parties have to be taken from the initial deposits. This reflects the
concern that agents can walk away from the contract at any time and commitment
to participate after having agreed to do so cannot be enforced. On the downside,
depositing involves an implicit cost for the participants in the smart contract: This
can be the opportunity cost of not using the deposit while the contract is executed,
borrowing costs of the agent, risk of loss of the deposit if the consensus protocol
fails. In particular, mechanisms that use punishment through huge negative trans-
fers in case of ”miss-behavior” of agents would be impractical. Even though the
punishments are only executed off the equilibrium path, huge deposits have to be
made in order to make the threat of punishment credible. This would make such
mechanisms very costly to implement as a smart contract.
In this paper, we study the design of optimal smart contracts as a mechanism
design problem. We study this question in a context motivated by a practical prob-
lem. A file exchange smart contract platform with deposits, such as FileBounty3, or
BitBay4, mediates the exchange of a file between a seller and a buyer of a file, requir-
ing deposits from both sides of the trade. Sending the file is costly and the contract
has to incentivize the seller to send the file to the buyer. The smart contract uses
(the threat of) a costly verification procedure to incentive the file exchange. Exam-
ples of such verification procedures include revealing some contents of the file on a
publicly available web page, together with the magnet link to a file which can only
be downloaded by the buyer, or some physical (video, photo) proof which is checked
by some randomly chosen nodes of the blockchain network in exchange for financial
payoff (an ”oracle” in the blockchain parlance) to reach a consensus on its validity,
in a similar manner as consensus is achieved in proof of stake blockchains.5 We
consider the size of the deposits as part of the design problem and analyze optimal
smart contracts where the opportunity cost of deposits is taken into account when
designing a contract.
We provide a rigorous analysis of the problem as a mechanisms design problem,
social welfare is optimized subject to incentive and participation constraints, and
2We are not claiming that a smart contract is the only way for contracting parties to enforce actions.
There might be other mechanisms to enforce the contract in case of misbehavior (account suspension,
reputation damage if the identity is known, legal enforcement, etc.). However, smart contracts provide
mechanisms for enforcement when these other mechanisms are not readily available or costly.
3https://chainsolutions.com/filebounty-protocol/
4https://bitbay.market/double-deposit-escrow
5Dziembowski et al. (2018) and Allen et al. (2019) study the practical design of such a protocol on
the blockchain. The protocol in Dziembowski et al. (2018) includes deposits and a costly verification
procedure and Allen et al. (2019) consider a dispute resolution procedure, an instance of what we call
costly verification procedure. We abstract away of the specifics of the verification procedure and instead
study the economic question of optimally designing deposits and monitoring policies.
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characterize the optimal contracts. We consider two possible scenarios that differ in
how much communication is feasible: in the first, the contract only interacts with
the sender of the file 6. In this case, the seller can be monitored and be asked to prove
whether he has sent the file. Proving is costly. We derive an optimal monitoring
policy and optimal deposits. In the optimal contract, the sender is monitored with
a probability that is increasing in the opportunity cost of depositing and decreasing
in the cost of monitoring. Payments to the sender can be conditioned on whether
he is monitored or not. There are two focal contracts within the class of optimal
contracts. In the seller optimal contract, the payments when monitored and when
not monitored are the same. In the buyer optimal contract, the seller is only paid
if he is monitored and otherwise receives no transfer.
In the second scenario, the contract can also interact with the buyer and the
contract uses the signals from both players. If communication with the buyer is
allowed, the threat of monitoring is sufficient to induce truthful behavior. First, we
show that monitoring is required, at least with some positive probability, in order
to be able to distinguish between two states. Otherwise, during the execution of
the contract, multiple equilibria can arise some of which do not induce exchange of
the file. In the monitoring equilibrium, the buyer reveals whether the file has been
sent or not. If the cost of verification is low, the only deposit has to be made by the
buyer, which would be taken away by the seller if he is monitored and he proves,
or if he is not monitored. If the cost of verification is high, both the seller and the
buyer need to deposit an amount such that the sum of deposits covers the cost of
verification. Again there can be different optimal contracts that are more or less
favorable for the seller or buyer. If the buyer deposits more, then the seller receives
a) a higher price and b) can deposit less money, as the opportunity cost of forgoing
the price provides incentives for him to prove if monitored. With a low cost of
verification, though, there is just one optimal contract and favorable contracts for
the seller and the buyer separately can not be designed.
1.1 Related Literature
Townsend (1979) initiated the study of optimal deterministic mechanisms with
costly state verification. Gale and Hellwig (1985) apply the approach to the de-
sign of optimal debt contracts. Mookherjee and Png (1989) extended the class
of available mechanisms by considering random mechanisms and studied optimal
auditing contracts with costly verification. The authors show that in the case of
finitely many hidden states of the insured person’s income, an optimal auditing
strategy randomizes between monitoring and not monitoring. One difference be-
tween our paper and their earlier work is that we consider the effect of deposits that
lead to randomized monitoring, while risk aversion induced randomized monitoring
in their case.
Witkowski et al. (2011) develop incentive compatible and individually rational
mechanisms using intermediary and buyer acknowledgement. We can see smart
contracts as such intermediary. Our mechanism two is somewhat similar to their
6There are a number of reasons why the participation of the buyer is not desirable. First, the buyer
might be reluctant to send such a signal of item receipt for privacy reasons. Second, it requires the buyer
to be online at some point during the execution time of the contract. Therefore, this procedure can not
efficiently be automatized by the seller to sell a large number of items.
3
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mechanism in respect of getting information from both parties. Depositing money
from both the seller and the buyer in the file exchange setting, and its game-
theoretical analysis is a topic of recent paper by Asgaonkar and Krishnamachari
(2019).
Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) study optimal mechanism design under money
burning and show that in certain settings it improves the objective function. Though
the mechanisms developed in our paper do not burn money in equilibrium state(s),
money burning occurs in the off-equilibria state(s). Ben-Porath et al. (2014) study
the optimal allocation of one item among multiple agents with costly verification
and show that randomization is required. Commitment is not needed in smart
contracts, since deposits guarantee self-enforcement of such contracts. The role of
commitment and evidence in mechanism design is the topic of Ben-Porath et al.
(2019).
Smart contracts attracted some attention in the law and economics literature as
well. Cong and He (2019) study the role of smart contracts and decentralized con-
sensus in the market organization and asymmetric information environment. Holden
and Malani (2017) study ways how smart contracts can be used into solving holdup
problem.
On a high level our model is also related to mechanism design for bilateral
trade Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983); Blumrosen and Dobzinski (2014). How-
ever, our model focuses on incentivizing exchange rather than the question to elic-
iting private information about valuations for the exchange.
2 Model
There are two agents: a risk-neutral seller, denoted by S, and a risk-neutral buyer,
denoted by B. There is one item, denoted by I. There are two relevant dates, which
we call ”today” and ”tomorrow”. Today a contract is agreed upon, which specifies
details about monitoring decisions, possible messages and transfers in the different
states. Tomorrow the seller decides whether or not he sends the file, the contract
is executed and transfers are paid out. The seller can verify the act of sending the
item on the contract, yet at a cost of verification c > 0. The contract can monitor
if the submission happened, by asking the seller to provide a proof of this event. It
can also randomize this process.
The utility is quasi-linear in transfers. Seller’s valuation for sending the item is
vS(s) and his valuation for not sending the item is vS(s¯). Buyer’s valuation (today)
for receiving the item vB(s) and his valuation for not receiving the item is vB(s¯).
We normalize valuations such that vB(s)− vB(s¯) = v, and vS(s¯)− vS(s) = 1. The
time between today and tomorrow is discounted with 1 − δ for 0 < δ < 1, so that
if an agent deposits D today and gets paid out his entire deposit tomorrow, he
has incurred an opportunity cost of δD. Alternatively, we can think of δ as other
costs of depositing money (borrowing costs, the volatility of the currency in which
deposits are made, etc.) We denote the deposit of the buyer by D(B) and the
deposit of the seller by D(S).
In a terminal state w, the contract pays out transfers tSw to the seller and t
B
w
to the buyer. For each final state w, it must hold that tSw ≥ 0 and tBw ≥ 0 and
the following budget balance constraint: tSw + t
B
w ≤ D(B) + D(S). That is, the
4
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smart contract can burn money, but it can not create money. We denote the pair
of transfers (tSw, t
B
w) with tw.
In the following, we are interested in contracts that maximize welfare (the sum
of utilities), subject to incentive and participation constraints.
2.1 One-sided communication
We first consider the situation, where only the seller exchanges information with the
contract. Since there are only two pay-off relevant states, we may assume without
loss of generality (by the revelation principle) that there are two possible messages
that the seller can send, which we denote by {”sent”, ”not sent”}. The seller is
required to notify the smart contract about whether he has sent the item or not.
There is some timeout, during which the seller has to respond. After having sent a
message, the seller can be monitored. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that monitoring only happens if the message ”sent” has been received. Thus if the
seller sends the message ”not sent”, the mechanism ends and transfer ts¯ are realized.
If the seller sends the message ”sent”, the contract randomizes between monitoring
and not monitoring. Monitoring happens with probability α. If monitoring does
not happen, transfers ts,M¯ are realized. If monitoring happens, the seller is asked
to provide the proof of sending. If the seller provides a proof, the transfers ts,M,P
are realized, otherwise, transfers ts,M,P¯ are realized.
There are 4 final states, w1 = (s,M,P ), w2 = (s,M, P¯ ), w3 = (s, M¯) and
w4 = (s¯). Note that messages to the contract and actions are both part of a
strategy set of a player.
Suppose we want to implement a contract where the seller always sends the file.
Such an optimal contract minimizes the sum of the expected monitoring cost and
the opportunity cost of depositing, subject to the relevant incentive and partici-
pation constraints. It is without loss of generality to assume that the mechanism
is strongly budget balanced, because the buyer can get paid out any remaining
deposits, after transfers to the seller have been realized. As only the seller in-
teracts with the mechanism, this will not influence the incentive constraints, the
participation constraint of the seller and will make satisfying the participation con-
straint of the buyer easier. In the following for each 1 ≥ α ≥ 0, we define by
Eα[t
S
s ] := αt
S
s,M,P + (1 − α)tSs,M¯ the expected transfer to the seller, in case he has
sent the file, assuming that he will always provide a proof if he is asked to (as he
will optimally do) and analogously define Eα[t
B
s ] := αt
B
s,M,P + (1 − α)tBs,M¯ . Then
solving for the optimal contract such that the file is always sent, amounts to solving
the following cost minimization problem.
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minα(1− δ)c+ δ(D(B) +D(S))
subject to Eα[t
S
s ]− αc ≥ 1 + tSs¯
tSs¯ ≥ αtSs,M,P¯ + (1− α)tSs,M¯
v + Eα[t
B
s ] ≥
D(B)
1− δ
Eα[t
S
s ]− αc ≥ 1 +
D(S)
1− δ
0 ≤ tSw + tBw ≤ D(B) +D(S) for each w
tSw, t
B
w ≥ 0 for each w
D(B), D(S) ≥ 0
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
The first two constraints are incentive constraints of the seller. He should send the
file rather than not send the file and truthfully reveal that he has not sent the file
if he has not done so. The other incentive constraints are implied by these two, i.e.
the seller will always reveal that he has sent the file if he has done so, and he will
prove that he has sent the file if he is monitored and has sent the file. The third
and fourth constraints are individual rationality constraints of the buyer and the
seller. Note that they include the opportunity cost of depositing.
We first derive optimal deposits, given a particular monitoring policy.
Proposition 1. If the seller is monitored with probability 0 < α ≤ 1, then the
problem is feasible if and only if
v − 1 ≥ αc+ δ
1− δ (
1
α
+ c).
In that case, optimal deposits are
D(S) = x and D(B) =
1
α
+ c− x for any 0 ≤ x ≤ (1− δ)(1− α)( 1
α
+ c).
Proof. First, we show that in any feasible contract for a given monitoring proba-
bility α we have D(B) + D(S) ≥ 1α + c. We show that this holds for an optimal
contract, and hence for any feasible contract. First observe that it is without loss
of generality to assume that in an optimal contract tS
s,M,P¯
= 0 (for each feasible
solution, decreasing tS
s,M,P¯
will not change the objective value of the problem and
will not change the feasibility of the problem). Next observe that it is also without
loss of generality to assume that in optimal contract tSs¯ = (1−α)tSs,M¯ (as tSs,M,P¯ = 0,
for each feasible solution with tSs¯ > (1−α)tSs,M¯ , decreasing tSs¯ without violating the
constraint will not change the objective value of the problem and will not change
the feasibility of the problem). Combining tSs¯ = (1−α)tSsM¯ with the first constraint,
we obtain
Eα[t
S
s ]− αc ≥ 1 + (1− α)tSs,M¯
6
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or equivalently
αtSs,M,P − αc ≥ 1.
Thus
D(B) +D(S) ≥ tSs,M,P ≥
1
α
+ c.
An immediate consequence is that the condition v − 1 ≥ αc + δ1−δ ( 1α + c) is nec-
essary for a feasible solution, as otherwise, the gains from trade do not exceed the
monitoring and deposit costs (which are at least δ( 1α + c) in each feasible solu-
tion). The condition is also sufficient, since following class of contracts is feasible
and satisfies D(B) + D(S) = 1α + c: Let 0 ≤ x ≤ (1 − δ)(1 − α)( 1α + c). Let
D(B) = 1α +c−x,D(S) = x, tSs,M,P = 1α +c, tSs,M¯ = x(1−α)(1−δ) , tSs¯ = x1−δ , tSs,M,P¯ = 0.
Note that the IC constraints and IR constraint for the seller hold (with equality).
Moreover, if (1− δ)(v− 1) ≥ (1− δ)αc+ δD(B), then the IR constraint of the seller
holds, as:
v + (1− α)D(B) = v +D(B)− 1− αc ≥ D(B)
1− δ .
Finally, we show that the optimal deposits have to be chosen such that D(S) ≤
(1− δ)(1− α)( 1α + c). As we have shown, in an optimal contract, we have D(B) +
D(S) = 1α + c. Thus t
S
s,M,P ≤ 1α + c and tSs,M¯ ≤ 1α + c. Therefore, by the IR
constraint of the seller, 1α + c − αc = 1 + (1 − α)( 1α + c) ≥ 1 + D(s)1−δ , and therefore
(1− δ)(1− α)( 1α + c) ≥ D(S).
The proposition implies the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If the problem is feasible, in each optimal solution the buyer is
monitored with probability
α = min{
√
δ
(1− δ)c , 1}.
Proof. By Proposition 1, we may assume that the sum of the monitoring cost and
deposit cost is
α(1− δ)c+ δ( 1α + c).
Minimizing this expression over all 0 < α ≤ 1 yields the desired α.
In general, there is a continuum of optimal contracts available that distribute
the surplus differently between the seller and buyer. The payments in the non-
monitoring case and the size of the seller’s deposit determine the surplus distribu-
tion. We can characterize the seller optimal contract and the buyer optimal contract
among the optimal contracts.
Proposition 3. Let α = min{
√
δ
(1−δ)c , 1} and (1−δ)(v−1) ≥ (1−δ)αc+δ( 1α + c).
1. There is an optimal contract that is most preferred among optimal contracts by
the seller: The seller deposits D(S) = 0 and the buyer deposits D(B) = 1α + c.
The seller receives the full deposit D(B), if he messages ”sent” and he is not
monitored or monitored and provides a proof. He receives tSs¯ = (1 − α)D(B)
if he messages ”not sent” and nothing if he does not prove if monitored.
7
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2. There is an optimal contract that is most preferred among optimal contracts by
the buyer: The seller deposits D(S) = 0 and the buyer deposits D(B) = 1α + c.
The seller receives the full deposit, if he is monitored and provides a proof,
and nothing in all other states.
Proof. By Proposition 2, in each optimal contract, the seller is monitored with
probability α. Moreover, for the given α, in both contracts, all constraints are
satisfied. In the first contract the IR constraint of the seller binds, as αD(B)−αc =
α( 1α + c) − αc = 1. Thus the contract is buyer optimal. In the second contract,
the buyer obtains the whole deposit in all states that are reached with positive
probability. Hence the contract is optimal for him.
In both contracts, the seller does not make a deposit. However, there also exist
optimal contracts where he deposits a positive amount. In these contracts, the
payment in case of non-monitoring to the seller cover his depositing cost.
If the seller is completely risk-neutral, as we have assumed, the contract that
pays him the deposit, if monitored, and nothing if not monitored, appears focal.
It yields the highest pay-off for the seller, and only involves side-payments to the
seller if the file has been sent. If we would relax the assumption of risk neutrality,
an interior contract where payments in the monitoring and non-monitoring case are
more equal, becomes more sensible.
Hidden Cost
Our previous discussion assumed that the monitoring cost is known. The analysis
can be extended to the case where the monitoring cost is private information of the
seller. As in a standard screening model, a menu of contracts can be offered where
different type sellers choose different contracts. We briefly sketch the extension to
the case with two cost types. Suppose there are two possible costs 0 < cL < cH and
a fraction pi of high-cost types and a fraction 1− pi of low-cost types. Similarly as
in the proof of Proposition 1 for the full information case, one can show that there
is an optimal menu where contracts are offered such that only the buyer makes a
deposit, the seller receives the full deposit if monitored and nothing in all other
states. However, the deposits (and thus the payment to the seller) is different than
in the full information case. The (expected) cost minimization problem becomes
minpi((1− δ)αLcL + δDL(B)) + (1− pi)((1− δ)αHcH + δDH(B))
subject to αLDL(B)− αLcL ≥ αHDH(B)− αHcL
αHDH(B)− αHcH ≥ αLDL(B)− αLcH
αLDL(B)− αLcL − 1 ≥ 0
αHDH(B)− αHcH − 1 ≥ 0
(1− δ)(v − αHDH(B)) ≥ DH(B)
(1− δ)(v − αLDL(B)) ≥ DL(B)
0 ≤ αH ≤ αL ≤ 1, DH(B), DL(B) ≥ 0
αX is the probability of monitoring, DX(B) and DX(S) are deposits of the buyer
and the seller, respectively, for each type contract X ∈ {L,H}. It is straightforward
to see that the IR constraint of the high type binds and that the IC constraint that
8
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the low-cost type should take up the low-cost contract binds. Thus we obtain the
conditions that
DH(B) =
1
αH
+ cH
DL(B) =
1
αL
+ cL +
αH
αL
(cH − cL)
Note that in comparison to the full information case, a larger deposit and corre-
sponding larger payments to the seller have to be made in the low-cost contract.
The optimal deposits lead to the following expression for the cost function:
pi((1− δ)αLcL + δ( 1
αL
+ cL +
αH
αL
(cH − cL))) + (1− pi)((1− δ)αHcH + δ( 1
αH
+ cH)).
The cost function is convex in the probabilities. Thus an optimum can be charac-
terized by the first order conditions:
δ
α2L
+
δαH(cH − cL)
α2L
= (1− δ)cL,
δ
α2H
=
pi
(1− pi)αL (cH − cL) + (1− δ)cH .
2.2 Communication with both parties
Next, we consider the case where also the buyer exchanges information with the con-
tract. the contract requires the buyer to confirm that he has received the item. As
before, it is without loss of generality to consider two messages, as there are only two
payoff-relevant states. We denote the two possible messages by: {”received”,”didn’t
receive”}. It is without loss of generality, to only use messages by the buyer, since
a mechanism that also interacts with the seller cannot be more efficient, as both of
the players hold the same bit of information.
The buyer is required to notify the smart contract about whether he has received
the item or not. There is some timeout, during which the buyer has to respond.
After having sent a message, the seller can be monitored. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that monitoring only happens if the message ”didn’t receive” has
been received. Thus, if the buyer sends the message ”received”, the mechanism
ends and transfers tr are realized. If the buyer sends the message ”didn’t receive”,
the mechanism randomizes with certain probability between monitoring and not
monitoring. If monitoring does not happen, the mechanism ends and the transfers
tr¯,M¯ are realized. Monitoring happens with probability α, in which case the seller
is asked to provide a proof of sending. If the seller provides a proof, the transfers
tr¯,M,P are realized. If the seller does not provide a proof, the transfers tr¯,M,P¯ are
realized.
2.2.1 No Monitoring
There is a contract that achieves the first-best outcome and does not monitor at
all. Note that if the mechanism does not monitor, the buyer will always choose the
message which has the higher transfer for him (this is a form of cheap talk). Note
9
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that there are only two final states in this case, (r) and (r¯). If the buyer plays the
truthful response in both cases, the seller can be incentivized to send the file by
receiving a sufficiently large positive transfer in the state ”received” and zero in the
state ”didn’t receive”. Optimally, the transfer in the state ”received” will exactly
compensate the seller for sending the file.7 This mechanism satisfies all incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
The contract without monitoring relies on the seller believing that the buyer
will be truthful. He will only sign the contract if subsequently an equilibrium move,
where the buyer chooses the truthful strategy, is played. Similarly, the buyer will
only sign the contract if subsequently an equilibrium move, where the seller sends
the file, is played. Thus the contract is only implemented if both parties believe
that subsequently an efficient equilibrium move is played. If the players believe that
an inefficient equilibrium is played, if the contract is implemented, they might not
want to sign it. Monitoring allows to eliminate the inefficient equilibria and hence
guarantees implementation, but at a cost. Next, we will discuss optimal contracts
with a positive probability of monitoring.
2.2.2 Monitoring
In this section, we consider the case, where monitoring happens with probability
0 < α ≤ 1. Suppose we want to implement a contract where monitoring happens
with probability α, the seller always sends the file and the buyer always truthfully
reveals whether the file has been sent.
As the buyer truthfully reveals the state, monitoring is off-equilibrium, and such
optimal contract minimizes opportunity cost of depositing, subject to the relevant
incentive and participation constraints. Appropriate deposits have to be made in
order to make the threat of monitoring credible, even though monitoring will not
happen in equilibrium. Similarly, now money burning can happen, but only off
equilibrium. The cost minimization problem is:
min δ(D(B) +D(S))
tSr¯,M,P − c ≥ tSr¯,M,P¯
tSr ≥ 1 + αtSr¯,M,P¯ + (1− α)tSr¯,M¯
tBr ≥ αtBr¯,M,P + (1− α)tBr¯,M¯
tBr ≤ αtBr¯,M,P¯ + (1− α)tBr¯,M¯
(1− δ)(v + tBr ) ≥ D(B)
(1− δ)(tSr − 1) ≥ D(S)
tSw + t
B
w ≤ D(S) +D(B) for each w
tSw, t
B
w ≥ 0 for each w
D(B), D(S) ≥ 0
7If a larger transfer would be selected, inefficiently large deposits would have to be made. Since
the buyer is indifferent between sending two different signals to the contract, the equilibrium is not
”trembling-hand” perfect. However, there is a close to an optimal contract, where tSr is slightly above
the seller’s indifference value.
10
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The first and second conditions are IC constraints for the seller to provide a proof
if monitored and to send the file in the beginning. The third and fourth constraints
are IC constraints of the buyer to truthfully reveal whether the file has been sent.
The fifth and sixth constraints are the individual rationality constraints of the buyer
and seller.
We first derive optimal contracts, given a particular monitoring policy.
Proposition 4. If the seller is monitored with probability 0 < α ≤ 1, then the
problem is feasible if and only if
v − 1 ≥ δ
1− δ max{1, c}.
In that case optimal deposits for c ≤ 1 are
D(B) = 1, D(S) = 0,
and for c > 1 are
D(B) = x, D(S) = c− x, for any δc+ (1− δ) ≤ x ≤ c.
Proof. The following transfers incentivize sending in equilibrium:
tSr = max{1, c}, tSr¯,M,P = c, tSr¯,M¯ = tSr¯,M,P¯ = 0,
tBr = t
B
r¯,M¯ = t
B
r¯,M,P = t
B
r¯,M,P¯ = 0,
One readily checks that the IC constraints are satisfied.
For the IR constraints, we distinguish the case that c ≥ 1 and c ≤ 1. For c ≥ 1,
the IR constraint for the buyer becomes: (1− δ)(v+ tBr ) ≥ x and the IR constraint
of the seller becomes: (1− δ)(c− 1) ≥ c− x or equivalently x ≥ δc+ (1− δ). Since
tBr ≤ c−tSr = c−1, we get that (1−δ)(v+c−1) ≥ x, which implies that x ≤ c, from
the feasibility condition. Thus, the two IR constraints are satisfied by construction.
For c ≤ 1 we let D(B) = 1 and D(S) = 0. Seller’s individual rationality
constraint is satisfied by construction. Buyer’s individual rationality constraint is
(1− δ)v ≥ 1 or equivalently (1− δ)(v− 1) ≥ δ. Thus, by our feasibility assumption
it is satisfied.
Budget balance constraints are satisfied by construction.
Note that the objective function can not be improved: Deposits need to cover at
least the monitoring cost. Thus we need total deposits of at least c. Furthermore, in
the state r, the seller needs to receive at least 1, to satisfy his individual rationality
constraint. Finally note that the feasibility condition is necessary, as otherwise the
gains of trade do not exceed the depositing cost.
Remark 1. With deposits of exactly max{1, c}, we theoretically have the same
problem as in our discussion of the no monitoring case: Incentive constraints only
hold with weak inequality, and in particular the buyer is indifferent between telling
the truth and lying. However, this is a boundary case and with deposits slightly
greater than max{1, c}, we can strictly incentivize truth-telling by the buyer, and
sending and proving by the seller.
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Similarly, as in the previous section, there exist a continuum of optimal contracts
(for high cost) that distribute the surplus differently between the buyer and the
seller.
Proposition 5. Let 0 < α ≤ 1.
1. For c ≤ 1, there is a unique surplus distribution in the optimal contract with
monitoring probability α where the buyer extracts the whole surplus.
2. For c ≥ 1, there is an optimal contract that is most preferred among opti-
mal contracts with monitoring probability α by the seller: The buyer deposits
D(B) = c, the seller deposits D(S) = 0. If the buyer confirms, the seller
receives the full deposit tSr = c, if the buyer does not confirm, the seller re-
ceives the full deposit if he proves and nothing if he does not prove. The buyer
receives no transfer in any state.
3. For c ≥ 1, there is an optimal contract that is most preferred among optimal
contracts with monitoring probability α by the buyer: In the contract deposits
are D(B) = c and D(S) = 0. If the buyer confirms, the seller receives tSr = 1,
if the buyer does not confirm, the seller receives the full deposit if he proves
and nothing if he does not prove. The buyer receives tBr = t
B
r¯,M¯
= tB
r¯,M,P¯
= c−1
and tBr¯,M,P = 0.
The result of Proposition 4 holds for any α ∈ (0, 1] and for each such α the
contract achieves optimal welfare among contracts that monitor with positive prob-
ability. Note however that in the constructed optimal contract, money is burned
in 3 states (r¯, M¯), (r¯,M, P ) and (r¯, M¯). If we require strong budget balanced-
ness (money is not burned in any state, even off equilibrium), that is, tSw + t
B
w =
D(S) + D(B) for each state w, then we need to require α ∈ [α∗, 1] for some α∗ to
achieve the same optimal objective.
Proposition 6. Let α∗ := 1max{1,c} . Then for any α ≥ α∗, there are deposits and
transfers that achieve the optimal welfare without burning money and for α < α∗,
there are no deposits and transfers that achieve the optimal welfare without burning
money.
Proof. First, we show that for α < α∗, the optimal objective can not be achieved.
Combine the IC constraint of the seller to send with the truth-telling constraint of
the seller to confirm sending if the buyer has sent the file with the strong budget
balancedness, we get the following chain of (in)equalities
D(S) +D(B) = tSr + t
B
r ≥ 1 + αtSr¯,M,P¯ + αtSr¯,M,P + (1− α)(tSr¯,M¯ + tBr¯,M¯ ) =
1 + (1− α)(D(S) +D(B)).
Therefore, α ≥ 1D(S)+D(B) . By Proposition 4, for an optimal contract we have
D(S) +D(B) = max{1, c}. Thus, α ≥ 1max{1,c} in an optimum.
On the other hand, for α ≥ α∗ we can design deposits and transfers, that induce
sending at minimal deposit costs. We consider deposits as in Proposition 4. For
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c ≥ 1 we take transfers as follows:
tSr = t
S
r¯,M,P = t
S
r¯,M¯ = c, t
S
r¯,M,P¯ = 0,
tBr = t
B
r¯,M¯ = t
B
r¯,M,P = 0, t
B
r¯,M,P¯ = c,
The proof that these transfers work is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.
For c ≤ 1, we take transfers as follows:
tSr = 1, t
S
r¯,M,P = 1, t
S
r¯,M,P¯ = 0, t
S
r¯,M¯ = 0,
tBr = 0, t
B
r¯,M,P = 0, t
B
r¯,M,P¯ = 1, t
B
r¯,M¯ = 1.
The proof that these transfers work is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.
Hidden cost
In contrast to the case of one-sided communication with the seller, with hidden
cost, there is an optimal menu of contracts that achieves the first best and the
seller cannot extract any informational rent. Note that for each cost c > 0, there
exists a contract (see part c of Proposition 5) where the buyer deposits D(B) = c
and the seller is paid 1 independently of cost. In these contracts, the depositing cost
which is a function of the monitoring cost is entirely borne by the buyer. Thus we
can ask the seller for the monitoring cost and the seller has no incentive to report
a different cost.
3 Conclusion
We initiate the study of smart contracts through the classical mechanism design
perspective. In particular, we model the self-enforcing nature of smart contracts by
taking deposits as a design parameter into account. We discuss the optimal design
of contracts for file exchange. We identify the ranges of parameters and compare
the effects of having only the sender communicating with the contract versus both
players doing so. As a future agenda of research, we aim to study optimal smart
contract mechanisms under uncertainty, which may include the valuations of both
players. A similar approach developed in this paper can also be applied to insurance
contracts, with costly state verification and risk-averse players, if they are run
as smart contracts. It may suggest modification of existing contracts by adding
deposits for all possible state realizations.
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